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The Outer Limit of the Treaty Free Movement 
Provisions: Some Reflections on the 
Significance of Keck, Remoteness and 
Deliège 
 
ELEANOR SPAVENTA  
 
I  Introduction 
In writing a piece on the outer boundaries of the free movement provisions, it is 
inevitable to be forced to revisit very familiar concepts and case law. This 
investigation has led to findings that the present author had not anticipated: naively, 
one could have thought that the outer boundaries of the free movement of goods were 
a settled affair with the exception of the relationship between the doctrine of ‘effect 
too uncertain and indirect’ and the Keck selling arrangements. After all, the Keck 
ruling,
1
 for all its faults, helped both commentators and national courts to determine 
when a rule would fall within Article 28 EC: a product requirement is always caught 
while rules regulating the modalities of sale would in principle, and lacking 
discrimination, fall outside the scope of that provision. And yet, as noted by 
                                                 
 Durham European Law Institute, Durham University. I am very grateful to Michael Dougan and 
Catherine Barnard for their comments on an earlier draft. The usual disclaimer applies. 
1
 Joined Cases C-267/91 and C-268/91 Keck and Mithouard [1993] ECR I-6097. 
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Koutrakos,
2
 as different situations presented themselves, the Court was forced to 
‘fine-tune’ its approach and more rules have been brought back within the reach of 
Article 28 EC. On closer scrutiny, this fine-tuning might lead to the conclusion that 
the effect of the Keck ruling has been more limited and less revolutionary than 
anticipated, and consequently the boundaries of the free movement of goods less 
defined than one might have thought.  
On the other hand, one could have thought that the definition of the outer 
boundaries of the free movement of persons provisions might be more difficult: it is 
sufficient to recall the Carpenter ruling as a reminder of the breadth of these 
provisions.
3
 And yet, exactly because no attempt has so far been made to explicitly 
exclude a given type of rules from the scope of these provisions, the case law on the 
free movement of persons appears more internally consistent (which of course does 
not mean that is not hermeneutically problematic). Thus, almost all rules are caught 
by the free movement of persons provisions and once we accept the ‘discouragement’ 
test as a starting point this should not come as a surprise. There are only a handful of 
cases in which the Court excluded the relevance of the Treaty in cases concerning the 
free movement of persons and, by and large, in those cases the claimants were 
pushing the dicta of the Court beyond reasonable limits. This said, the discouragement 
test seems to find its physiological limits in relation to tax rules. Higher taxation in 
another Member State might clearly deter an economic operator from exercising its 
Treaty rights; and yet, the Court has so far (rightly) resisted the temptation to subject 
                                                 
2
 P Koutrakos, ‘On Groceries, Alcohol and Olive Oil: More on the Free Movement of Goods after 
Keck’ (2001) 26 EL Rev 391. 
3
 Case C-60/00 Carpenter v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2002] ECR I-6279. 
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the level of taxation to the proportionality assessment required once a rule is found to 
fall within the scope of the Treaty free movement provisions.    
This contribution will analyse these issues; it will start by introducing the 
reader to alternative conceptual backgrounds to the Keck ruling. It will then turn to a 
scrutiny of the doctrine of ‘effect too uncertain and indirect’; and the case law on 
selling arrangements. In this respect, it will highlight how the ‘refinement’ of the 
Court’s approach might signal a change in the very nature of the Keck presumption. It 
will then conclude with a brief analysis of the free movement of persons provisions, 
focusing on the different approach adopted in relation to tax rules.  
 
II  Redefining the Boundaries after Keck: Policy Decision or 
Coherent Hermeneutic Choice? 
 
The Keck settlement hardly needs repeating: faced with increasing criticism as well as 
the prospect of an unmanageable case load,
4
 the Court decided to exclude, as a matter 
of principle, some rules from the scope of the Treaty unless such rules were found to 
be directly or indirectly discriminatory.
5
 As a result, following the Keck ruling the test 
for assessing whether a non-directly discriminatory rule is to be defined as a measure 
                                                 
4
 For example, AG Van Gerven’s Opinion, Case C-145/88 Torfaen Borough Council v B & Q plc 
[1989] ECR I-3851; EL White, ‘In Search of the Limits to Article 30 of the EEC Treaty’(1989) 26 
CML Rev 235; K Mortelmans, ‘Article 30 of the EEC Treaty and Legislation Relating to Market 
Circumstances: Time to Consider a New Definition?’ (1991) 28 CML Rev 115. 
5
 Keck and Mithouard(n 1). 
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having equivalent effect,
6
 and therefore needs to be justified, seems to be—for 
practical purposes—tripartite.  
First, product requirements always fall within the scope of Article 28 EC, 
without there being any need to prove discrimination or a specific effect on intra-
Community trade.
7
  
Secondly, selling arrangements fall within the scope of Article 28 EC only 
insofar as they are directly or indirectly discriminatory,
8
 and possibly in the case in 
which they prevent access to the market of imported goods.
9
  
Thirdly, residual rules, that is those rules which are neither product 
requirements nor Keck selling arrangements (such as for instance bans on sale or 
use;
10
 inspections;
11
 registration
12
 and authorisation requirements;
13
 licence 
                                                 
6
 Of course quantitative restrictions (as well as discriminatory measure) always fall within the scope of 
Art 28 EC. 
7
 Keck and Mithouard (n 1), para 15. 
8
Ibid, para 16. 
9
 Case C-405/98 Konsumentombudsmannen (KO) v Gourmet International Products AB (GIP)[2001] 
ECR I-1795. 
10
 Case C-293/94 Criminal proceedings against Brandsma [1996] ECR I-3159; Case C-400/96 J 
Harpegnies [1998] ECR I-5121; Case C-473/98 Kemikalienspektionen v Toolex Alpha AB [2000] ECR 
I-5681. 
11
 Case C-105/94 Ditta A Celestini [1997] ECR I-2971. 
12
 Case C-55/99 Commission v France [2000] (Registration for reagents) ECR I-1149; Case C-390/99 
Canal Satélite Digital SL v Administracíon General del Estado, [2002] ECR I-607, where the Court 
excluded that the Keck ruling could apply because of ‘the need in certain cases to adapt the products in 
question to the rules in force in the Member State in which they are marketed’ (para 30); to the same 
effect also Case C-14/02 ATRAL SA V Belgium [2003] ECR I-4431.   
13
 Case C-120/95 N Decker v Caisse de Maladie des Employés Privés [1998] ECR I-1831. 
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requirements;
14
 restrictions on transport;
15
 and obligations to provide data for 
statistics
16
) fall within the scope of Article 28 EC if they affect directly or indirectly, 
actually or potentially intra-Community trade pursuant to the Dassonville formula.
17
 
However, this will not be the case when the effect of the rule on intra-Community 
trade is too uncertain and indirect to trigger Article 28 EC.
18
  
The landscape of the free movement of goods, and in particular of what 
exactly is to be considered a measure having equivalent effect to a restriction on 
imports, is therefore still varied even after the Keck ruling. In this respect, while the 
ruling has introduced a very useful system of presumptions to assess the need for 
justification of domestic rules (product requirements always fall in, selling 
arrangements mostly not, and for other rules it depends), it has not done much to 
clarify the outer boundaries of Article 28 EC, and the rationale underlying the case 
law.  
More specifically, in relation to ‘certain selling arrangements’, the reasoning 
in Keck carries a presumption that, at first, seemed not rebuttable: such rules are not 
                                                 
14
 Case C-189/95 Criminal proceedings against H Franzén [1997] ECR I-5909; it is not clear whether 
an obligation to store semen in authorised centres is a selling arrangements or not, cf Case C-323/93 
Société Civile Agricole du Centre d’Insémination de la Crespelle v Coopérative d’Elevage et 
d’Insémination Artificielle du Département de la Mayenne [1994] ECR I-5077, where the Court 
unusually refers to Case C-169/91 Council of the City of Stoke-on-Trent and Norwich City Council v B 
& Q plc [1992] ECR I-6635 (one of the Sunday trading cases) rather than to Keck. 
15
 Case C-350/97 W Monsees v Unabhängiger Verwaltungssenat für Kärnten [1999] ECR I-2921. 
16
 Case C-114/96 René Kieffer and Roman Thill [1997] ECR I-3629. 
17
 Case 8/74 Procureur du Roi v Dassonville [1974] ECR 83, para 5 (hereinafter the Dassonville 
formula). 
18
 For example, Case C-69/88 H Krantz GmbH & Co v Ontvanger der Directe Belastingen [1990] ECR 
I-583; see Section III below. 
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as such capable of either preventing access to the market, or of having an effect on 
market access different from the impact that such rules would have on access to the 
market of domestic products.
19
 However, the exact significance of this legal 
presumption introduced by the Keck ruling is still unclear. This is all the more so 
given the existence of the doctrine of ‘effect too uncertain and indirect’, which also 
excludes some rules from the scope of Article 28 EC. While this doctrine preceded 
the Keck ruling, and indeed could be seen as the first attempt by the Court to exclude 
the application of Article 28 EC in certain cases, its survival after Keck begs the 
question as to its relationship with the latter.    
In particular, it is unclear whether the presumption that non-discriminatory 
selling arrangements fall outside the scope of Article 28 EC is aimed at excluding 
rules that would otherwise be capable of affecting actually or potentially, directly or 
indirectly, intra-Community trade; or rather, whether such rules are excluded because 
they are not, as such, capable of affecting intra-Community trade, which is to say that 
their effect on intra-Community trade is uncertain and indirect if existing at all.
20
  
Here, the Keck ruling can be interpreted in both ways depending on what one 
considers to be the scope of application of the Treaty. Thus, those who were 
unsatisfied by the compromise reached by the Court argued that the focus on the type 
of rule, rather than on its effect, disregarded the fact that some selling arrangements 
                                                 
19
 Keck and Mithouard(n 1) para 17. 
20
 In which case para 17 of the Keck ruling would be nothing more than an explanation—such rules fall 
outside the scope of Art 28 EC because they do not prevent market access or impede it more than they 
impede access to the market of domestic goods.   
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could have an effect on intra-Community trade regardless of discrimination.
21
 This 
was argued to be the case especially in relation to some forms of advertising and long-
distance selling techniques.
22
 In the view of these authors, the a priori exclusion of 
such rules runs contrary to the aim of Article 28 EC, and to the spirit of the Dassonille 
formula. Viewed in this light then, the Keck ruling would have introduced nothing 
more than a legal presumption,
23
 so that Keck should be considered nothing more than 
a policy decision concerning the best level at which regulation should be enacted, a 
sui generis application by the Court of the principle of subsidiarity.
24
  
On the other hand, those who welcomed the Keck ruling did so in the belief 
that the aim of the Treaty free movement provisions was merely to prohibit 
discrimination on grounds of nationality
25
 or, in a broader reading,
26
 true barriers to 
                                                 
21
 For example, AG Jacobs’ Opinion in Case C-412/93 Leclerc-Siplec [1995] ECR I-179; L Gormley, 
‘Reasoning Renounced? The Remarkable Judgement in Keck & Mithouard’ (1994) 5 European 
Business Law Review 63–67, and ‘Two Years after Keck’ (1996) 19 Fordham Intlional Law Journal 
866; N Reich, ‘The “November Revolution” if the European Court of Justice: Keck, Meng and Audi 
Revisited’ (1994) 31 CML Rev 459; D Chalmers, ‘Repackaging the Internal Market—The ramifications 
of the Keck judgment’ (1994) 19 EL Rev 385; S Weatherill, ‘After Keck: some thoughts on how to 
clarify the clarification’ (1996) 33 CML Rev 885; I Higgins, ‘The Free and Not so Free Movement of 
Goods since Keck’ (1997) 6 Irish Journal of European Law 166; C Barnard, ‘Fitting the remaining 
pieces into the goods and persons jigsaw?’ (2001) 26 EL Rev 35. 
22
 See especially AG Jacobs’ Opinion in Leclerc-Siplec ibid. 
23
 See to this effect the Opinion of Advocate General Fennelly in Case C-190/98 V Graf v Filzmoser 
Maschinenbau GmbH [2000] ECR I-493, para 19. 
24
 See also AG Tizzano’s Opinion in Case C-442/02 Caixa-Bank [2004] ECR I-8961, especially paras 
59 and ff on the relationship between the allocation of competences in the EC Treaty and the 
interpretation of the primary free movement provisions; and G Davies, ‘Can Selling Arrangements Be 
Harmonised?’ (2005) 30 EL Rev 371.  
25
 For example, N Bernard, Multi Level Governance in the European Union (London, Kluwer Law 
International, 2002); and J Snell, Goods and Services in EC Law (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 
2002). 
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intra-Community movement/trade. Interpreted in this way, the Treaty should have no 
effect on the regulatory autonomy of the Member States, or their ability to decide 
upon the correct level of market regulation. The only limitation clearly and expressly 
imposed by the Treaty concerned the need to afford equal treatment to out-of-State 
economic operators (or not to raise unjustified barriers to intra-Community 
movement/trade). In this interpretation then, the Keck ruling simply rectified the 
wrong turn taken by the Court during the Sunday trading saga, when rules which did 
not have discriminatory effects (or any effect at all on intra-Community trade), were 
brought within the scope of Article 28 EC. Seen in this light, Keck would not 
introduce any presumption; rather, it simply clarifies that, lacking discrimination, 
certain rules are not per se capable of preventing market access or affect it more than 
they affect market access for domestic goods. Certain selling arrangements are 
excluded from the scope of the Treaty not because of a policy decision of sorts, but 
simply because they do not have an effect on intra-Community trade. As a result, the 
rationale behind the Keck ruling would be the same as the rationale behind the 
doctrine of ‘effect too uncertain and indirect’: in both cases the Treaty does not apply 
because there is no effect on the free movement of goods.  
As we shall see in the next sections, both explanations of the Keck ruling 
reflect, at different times, the Court’s case law. Thus, it will be argued that in the 
aftermath of the ruling, the almost mechanical application of the Keck presumption 
might lead to the conclusion that it was best qualified as a policy decision, thus 
lending support to those who criticised the Court for its lack of hermeneutic 
                                                                                                                                            
26
 See also AG Poiares Maduro’s Opinion in Case C-158/04 Alfa Vita Vassilopoulos [2006] ECR I-
8135. 
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consistency. However, in more recent years, following a fine-tuning in the approach 
to both discrimination and what is to be considered a certain selling arrangement,
27
 
the nature of the Keck ruling might have evolved, so that the focus has shifted back to 
ascertaining whether the rules under scrutiny affect intra-Community trade.  
Before turning to the analysis of the Keck case law it is useful to examine the 
scope of the doctrine of ‘effect too uncertain and indirect’ since the question as to the 
rationale underpinning the exclusion of certain selling arrangements from the scope of 
Article 28 EC is closely linked to the exclusion of certain rules because of the lack of 
effect on intra-Community trade.  
 
III  The Doctrine of ‘Effect too Uncertain and Indirect’ 
As mentioned above, the doctrine of ‘effect too uncertain and indirect’ was first 
formulated by the Court during the Sunday trading saga, and might be seen as a 
tentative attempt to curtail the breadth of the Dassonville formula. In Krantz,
28
 to the 
author’s knowledge the first case in which the doctrine was mentioned, the Court 
examined the compatibility with Article 28 EC of rules which granted tax authorities 
the power to seize moveable property from the premises of companies in order to 
recover tax debt. In analysing the issue, Advocate General Darmon argued that 
Torfaen (the first of the Sunday trading cases)
29
 indicated the presence of a lower 
limit before a measure having equivalent effect on imports could become discernible. 
                                                 
27
 See also Koutrakos, (n 2)391. 
28
 H Krantz GmbH & Co v Ontvanger der Directe Belastingen (n 18). 
29
 Case C-145/88 Torfaen Borough Council v B & Q plc [1989] ECR I-3851. 
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Thus, in his opinion, ‘the restrictive effects on imports, if inherent in legislation 
pursuing goals permitted by the Treaty, cannot, unless they are disproportionate, 
cause a measure to be regarded as a measure having equivalent effect to quantitative 
restrictions’.30 He then found that the rule in question in Krantz fell short of that lower 
limit since its effect on imports could not be substantiated.  
The Court followed a slightly different path to reach the same conclusion. It 
first found that the rules in question applied without distinction and did not seek to 
control intra-Community trade. It then added:  
 
Furthermore, the possibility that nationals of other Member-States would hesitate to 
sell goods on instalment terms to purchasers in the Member-State concerned because 
such goods would be liable to seizure by the collector of taxes if the purchasers failed 
to discharge their Dutch tax debts is too uncertain and indirect to warrant the 
conclusion that a national provision authorising such seizure is liable to hinder trade 
between Member-States. (para 11, emphasis added)  
 
Such an approach was repeated in Baskiciogullari,
31
 where the Court held that a 
German rule which imposed a duty to provide information on the parties to a contract 
fell outside the scope of Article 28 EC since its effect was too uncertain and indirect 
to be liable to hinder trade.  
As said above, both cases were decided during the Sunday trading saga; in this 
respect, Advocate General Tesauro’s opinion in Hünnermund32 (the opinion on which 
                                                 
30
 H Krantz GmbH & Co v Ontvanger der Directe Belastingen [(n 18), Opinion para 16. 
31
 Case C-93/92 Baskiciogullari [1993] ECR I-5009; here AG Van Gerwen found that the rule fell 
outside the scope of Art 28 without reference to the effect too uncertain and indirect doctrine.  
32
 Case C-292/92 R Hünermund and others v Landesapothekerkammer Baden-Wurttemberg [1993] 
ECR I-6787. 
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the Court based the Keck ruling) is interesting since it discusses, however briefly, 
these two cases in illustrating the confusion, and lack of coherent approach, that had 
characterised the Court’s interpretation of the free movement of goods since the mid-
1980s. In proposing what will effectively become the Keck test, Mr Tesauro clearly 
intended to replace the different approaches discernible in the case law with a single 
(and coherent) test. This notwithstanding, the test suggested by Mr Tesauro focused 
on the specific measure under consideration—a ban on advertising outside 
pharmacies—so that, even though Mr Tesauro’s reasoning was overall of general 
application, the test he proposed was not. Viewed in this light, then, it is not 
altogether surprising that the doctrine of ‘effect too uncertain and indirect’ survived 
the Keck ruling.
33
  
In subsequent case law, the doctrine of ‘effect too uncertain and indirect’ has 
been refined. In Peralta,
34
 the Court suggested that for a rule to fall outside the scope 
of Article 28 EC, three conditions need to be met: first of all, absence of 
discrimination; secondly, the rule should not be intended to regulate trade; and thirdly, 
the restrictive effects that the rule might have must be too uncertain and indirect to 
                                                 
33
 More recently, Advocate General Kokott fell short of suggesting that the doctrine of effect too 
uncertain and indirect be disposed of because of the difficulties inherent in its application, and that 
other rules be brought within the Keck presumption, Opinion in Case C-142/05 Åklagaren v Percy 
Mickelsson and Joakim Roos, delivered 14
 
December 2006, case still pending at the time of writing,  
para 46. 
34
 Case C-379/92 Peralta [1994] ECR I-3453, para 24; see also Joined Cases C-140 to 142/94 DIP v 
Comune di Bassano del Grappa [1995] ECR I-3257; Case C-96/94 Centro Servizi Spediporto v 
Spedizioni Maritima del Golfo Srl [1995] ECRI-2883; Case C-266/96 Corsica Ferries France v 
Gruppo Antichi Ormeggiatori del Porto di Genova and others [1998] ECR I-3949.       
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hinder trade between Member States. Peralta, albeit not always applied consistently,
35
 
therefore indicates that the doctrine and the Keck exception can be distinguished since 
the latter applies to non-discriminatory measures which are intended to regulate trade 
(although not specifically intra-Community trade); whilst the former applies to non-
discriminatory measures which do not regulate trade,
36
 albeit they might have some 
very remote effect on it.
37
 And in a way, the fact that the doctrine of ‘effect too 
uncertain and indirect’ applies only to non-trading rules is entirely in harmony with 
the Dassonville formula that refers to ‘trading rules’ which actually or potentially 
restrict intra-Community trade. We shall come back to this point further below.   
                                                 
35
 See also obiter in Case C-254/98 TK-Heimdienst [2000] ECR I-151; however, in Case C-231/03 
Coname [2005] ECR I-7287, para 20, the Court seems to suggest that a direct award without invitation 
to tender, considered indirectly discriminatory for lack of transparency, might fall outside the scope if 
the contract in question would be so modest so that it ‘could be reasonably maintained’ that out-of-
State undertakings would not have an interest, and therefore the effect of the lack of tender procedure 
would be too uncertain and indirect on the Treaty free movement provisions. It is unclear whether this 
obiter indicates that rules which might be qualified as indirectly discriminatory might be excluded from 
the scope of the Treaty pursuant to the uncertain effect doctrine; or whether the negligible economic 
value of the transaction might altogether exclude discrimination. The latter would be a more coherent 
approach. A similar confusion is discernible in Case C-20/03 Burmanjer [2005] ECR I-4133. 
36
 But see Burmanjeribid, in which the Court seems to suggest that the doctrine of effect too uncertain 
and indirect might apply also to trading rules.  
37
 See also Opinion of AG Fenelly in Case C67/97 D Bluhme [1998] ECR I-8033, especially paras 20 
and 21 where he considers separately the uncertain effect doctrine, and the Keck exception thus also 
suggesting a different scope of application for the two; and similarly the ECJ’s ruling paras 21 and 22 
in Case C-134/94 Esso Española [1995] ECR I-4223, in relation to rules which imposed upon 
petroleum traders a duty to supply at least four of the Canary islands; in Case C-44/08 BASF [1999] 
ECR I-6269, the Court, much as it did in V Graf v Filzmoser Maschinenbau GmbH(n 23), held that 
when the effect of a rule depends also on the unforeseeable decisions of economic operators, then the 
rule’s effect is too uncertain and indirect to be considered an obstacle falling within Art 28 EC.  
 
13 
The ruling in Semeraro Casa Uno,
38
 seems to support the fact that the ‘effect 
too uncertain and indirect’ doctrine applies only to non-trading rules. The case 
concerned Sunday trading rules and whether they were compatible with both the free 
movement of goods and the freedom of establishment. The Court found that the rules 
fell outside the scope of Article 28 EC pursuant to the Keck ruling; and that they fell 
outside the scope of Article 43 EC since they were non-discriminatory; they were not 
intended to regulate the conditions for establishment; and their effect was too 
uncertain and indirect to affect the freedom of establishment. The different approach 
adopted to scrutinise the same rules signals therefore that selling arrangements and 
rules the effect of which is too uncertain and indirect are conceptually distinct.  
In particular, and as explained by Advocate General La Pergola in BASF,
39
 in 
the latter case there is no causal link between rule and alleged restriction and for this 
reason the Dassonville formula, or the other free movement provisions, cannot apply. 
On the other hand, in relation to selling arrangements there might be an effect on 
intra-Community trade (for instance the reduction of the total volume of sales) and yet 
this effect is not relevant for the application of Article 28 EC.       
The fact that the doctrine of ‘effect too uncertain and indirect’ relates 
(exclusively) to non-trading rules might be further demonstrated by its use in relation 
to Article 29 EC.
40
 As it is well known, the scope of application of Article 29 EC is 
much narrower than the scope of Article 28 EC since it is limited to a prohibition of 
                                                 
38
 Joined Cases C-418/93 and others Semeraro Casa Uno Srl v Sindaco del Comune di Ebrusco [1996] 
ECR I-2975.   
39
 Opinion Case C-44/08 BASF [1999] ECR I-6269, para 18. 
40
 Cf, eg Case C-412/97 ED Srl v I Fenocchio [1999] ECR I-3845. 
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measures that restrict patterns of exports by establishing a difference between internal 
and external trade to the advantage of the former.
41
 And yet, the doctrine of ‘effect too 
uncertain and indirect’ has found its way in the assessment of alleged restrictions to 
exports. This is rather surprising since, should the rule be directly discriminatory and 
advantage domestic trade, then it would fall within the scope of Article 29 EC; but if 
it is not, by definition it does not fall within the scope of that provision and any 
reference to the doctrine of ‘effect too uncertain and indirect’ seems redundant. The 
fact that the Court still refers to the doctrine of ‘effect too uncertain and indirect’ then 
seems to confirm that it is a tool to exclude the application of the free movement 
provisions in relation to rules which do not regulate trade. It is in relation to those 
rules that the claimant will need to demonstrate the existence of a causal relationship 
between rule and alleged barrier; in relation to trading rules, however, the analysis 
will be exclusively focused on the existence of a barrier (however defined) since 
causation is taken for granted. Once the barrier is found to exist, there is no need for 
an investigation as to a causal relationship between that barrier and the situation at 
issue in the case under investigation.
42
 Here, one way to look at this difference would 
be to refer back to the Dassonville formula mentioned earlier: when assessing the 
compatibility of trading rules with Article 28 EC the causal connection is taken for 
granted because even potential barriers to intra-Community trade are caught. The 
                                                 
41
 Case 237/82 J Kaas BV et al. V Dutch Government Central Organ Zuivelkontrole [1984] ECR 483, 
para 22; more recently see Case C-12/02 Grilli [2003] ECR I-11585, especially para 42 in relation to 
the difference between the scope of Art 28 EC and Art 29 EC.  
42
 In this respect see, eg Case C-317/92 Commission v Germany (Expiry dates) [1994] ECR I-2039 
where the Court dismissed as irrelevant the German Government’s contention that rules restricting the 
expiry dates of certain products to two a year should not fall within the scope of Art 28 EC since the 
trader was in any event obliged to alter the packaging in order for the information to be given in 
German.   
 
15 
same however does not appear to be true in relation to non-trading rules: whilst a 
potential effect might be sufficient (there is no authority either way), it still needs to 
be proven.  
 
IV  Back to Dassonville?  
The Case Law Certain Selling Arrangements 
 
From the cursory analysis carried out above, it seems that the doctrine of ‘effect too 
uncertain and indirect’ and the Keck a priori exclusion of some non-discriminatory 
rules from the scope of Article 28 EC can be kept distinct. Whilst both are tools to 
exclude the application of Article 28 EC, the former applies to non-trading rules 
which have no causal connection with the alleged barrier; whilst the latter applies to 
non-discriminatory trading rules of a certain type. The significance of this difference 
will then depend on whether certain selling arrangements are trading rules which lack 
a sufficient causal connection with the alleged barrier to intra-Community trade; or 
whether such rules are excluded because of a priori decision as to the appropriate 
level at which regulation should be enacted (or in certain instances because of an a 
priori decision as to the merit of the legislation in question). In the former case, the 
only difference between the doctrine of effect ‘too uncertain and indirect’ and Keck 
would rest on the type of rule to which the respective doctrines are applied and the 
two doctrines could be easily merged into one test (albeit they still might be kept 
separate for ease of convenience). However, if selling arrangements are excluded 
 
16 
because of an a priori decision, then the difference between the Keck and the Peralta 
doctrine would be of a more substantive nature, in that Keck would relate to rules 
which affect intra-Community trade but are nonetheless excluded from the scope of 
Article 28 EC, whilst the Peralta-type rules would be excluded simply because they 
do not have an effect on intra-Community trade.  
It is therefore necessary to consider the case law on selling arrangements and 
in particular the extent to which rules regulating the modalities of sales are in practice 
excluded from the scope of the Treaty. In this respect, we can identify three trends in 
the case law: first, those cases in which the Court applies almost mechanically the 
Keck formula; secondly, those in which discrimination is used as a flexible tool that 
can be bent to include selling arrangements without there being the need for the trader 
to support with any evidence the existence of factual discrimination;
43
 thirdly, those 
cases in which the dividing line between rules which fall within the scope of the Keck 
exception and rules which fall within the standard Dassonville formula is not entirely 
clear.  
 
A  The Mechanical Application of the Keck Formula 
 
The first line of cases is predominant in the years immediately following the Keck 
judgment. In those cases, the Court applied the Keck ruling to exclude, for instance, 
                                                 
43
 See Koutrakos, (n 2) 391; also L Prete, ‘Of Motorcycles Trailers and Personal Watercrafts: the Battle 
over Keck’ (2008) 35 Legal Issues of Economic Integration 133.  
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Sunday trading rules and rules concerning opening hours;
44
 rules concerning where 
and how a product can be sold;
45
 and some rules concerning advertisement.
46
 Those 
cases are fairly straightforward: the application of the Keck formula is almost 
mechanical; the assessment of discrimination is purely abstract, if existing at all,
47
 and 
the burden of proof as to the existence of factual discrimination seems to lie with the 
claimant.
48
 Overall, the outcome in these cases is entirely predictable. The lack of any 
grounded assessment of the effect of the rules at issue on intra-Community trade thus 
might lend support to the view that, at least at first, the Keck ruling was better seen as 
a policy decision so that certain rules never fell within the scope of Article 28 EC 
simply because the Court so decided.   
 
B  The More Flexible Approach to Discrimination  
 
Less predictable is the second line of cases, where the broad interpretation of the 
notion of indirect discrimination allows the Court to scrutinise the justification and 
                                                 
44
 Case C-401/92 Tankstation [1994] ECR I-2199; Case C-69/93 Punto Casa Spa [1994] ECR I-2395; 
Semeraro Casa Uno Srl v Sindaco del Comune di Ebrusco and others(n 38). 
45
 Case C-391/92 Commission v Greece (milk for infants) [1995] ECR I-1621; Case C-387/93 
Banchero [1995] ECR I-4663; Case C-63/94 Belgapom [1995] ECR I-2467; Burmanjer (n 35); Case C-
441/04 A-Punkt Schmuckhandel [2006] ECR I-2093. 
46
 R Hünermund and others v Landesapothekerkammer Baden-Wurttemberg [1993](n 32); Leclerc-
Siplec(n 21); and, although rather confusing as a ruling, Case C-34/95 De Agostini [1997] ECR I-3843; 
and Case C-71/02 Karner [2004] ECR I-3025. 
47
 For example Case C-63/94 Belgapom [1995] ECR I-2467; Leclerc-Siplec (ibid) 
48
 Case C-34/95 De Agostini [1997] ECR I-3843. 
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proportionality of the rules under consideration. Measures which have been found to 
be indirectly discriminatory include: rules restricting door-to-door sales and sales on 
rounds of grocery products to traders having an establishment within the district or a 
bordering district of the place where the sale would be carried out (TK-Heimdienst);
49
 
rules prohibiting advertising of alcoholic beverages (Gourmet);
50
 rules on the 
packaging of bake-off products (Morellato);
51
 and rules on a prohibition of internet 
sales of medicinal products (DocMorris).
52
  
In these cases the assessment of discrimination seems not always to be based 
on much hard factual evidence. Rather, very much as it happens with the assessment 
of discrimination in the case of obstacles to the free movement of persons,
53
 it is 
based on assumptions as to the likely effect of the rules under consideration. Such 
assumptions, however, do not always stand a rigorous scrutiny.
54
 Take for instance 
TK-Heimdienst.
55
 In that case Advocate General La Pergola found that it was very 
unlikely that the rules concerning the sale on rounds of grocery products would have 
an effect on intra-Community trade since there is a ‘natural limit’ to the areas covered 
by that form of grocery distribution. On the other hand, the Court relied on purely 
                                                 
49
 Case C-254/98 Schutzverband gegen unlauteren Wettbewerb v TK-Heimdiest Sass GmbH [2000] 
ECR I-2487. 
50
 Konsumentombudsmannen (KO) v Gourmet International Products AB (GIP) (n 9). 
51
 Case C-416/00 T Morellato v Comune di Padova (No 2) [2003] ECR I-9343. 
52
 Case C-322/01 Deutscher Apothekerverband eV, 0800 DocMorris NV, Jacque Waterval [2004] ECR 
I-4887. 
53
 For example C-237/94 O’Flynn v Adjudication Officer [1996] ECR I-2617. 
54
 See also D Wilsher, ‘Does Keck discrimination make any sense? An assessment of the non-
discrimination principle in the European Single Market’ (2008) 33 EL Rev 3. 
55
 Schutzverband gegen unlauteren Wettbewerb v TK-Heimdiest Sass GmbH (n 49). 
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theoretical reasoning to find that the rules were indirectly discriminatory, therefore 
relieving the traders from the need to prove any existence of factual discrimination.  
Or consider the ruling in Morellato.
56
 There the issue related to packaging and 
labelling requirements for bake-off products, that is bakery products which are pre-
prepared and undergo only the final stage of baking in the premises where they are 
sold. The Court found that the rules at issue were not product requirements since they 
did not entail the need to modify the imported product. Since the rules related to the 
marketing stage they were to be considered as selling arrangements. The Court then 
held that there was unjustified factual discrimination. It based its finding on the fact 
that, since such products were not manufactured in Italy, the rules disadvantaged 
imported products only, in that they discouraged their imports or made the products 
less attractive to consumers. This broad interpretation of discrimination is at odds 
with established case law in relation to discriminatory taxation, where the Court has 
held that when there is no domestic production of goods similar to or in competition 
with the imported product there cannot be any discrimination;
57
 as well as with the 
Court’s own finding in the milk for infants case.58 In the latter case, the Commission 
brought proceedings against Greece in relation to rules which restricted the possibility 
to sell processed milk for infants to pharmacies. The Court held that the fact that 
Greece did not produce the goods in question was not relevant in the assessment of 
discrimination since the applicability of Article 28 EC:  
 
                                                 
56
 T Morellato v Comune di Padova (No 2) (n 51). 
57
 Case C-47/88 Commission v Denmark (registration duty for cars) [1990] ECR I-4509. 
58
 Commission v Greece (n 45). 
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cannot depend on such a purely fortuitous factual circumstance, which may, 
moreover, change with the passage of time. If it did, this would have the illogical 
consequence that the same legislation would fall under Article 30 [now 28] in certain 
Member States but fall outside the scope of that provision in other Member States 
(para 17, emphasis added).  
 
Whilst it might be argued that the Italian rules in Morellato might have had some 
protectionist effect in that they placed Italian in-store baked bread at an advantage, 
there is no indication in the ruling that that was the rationale underpinning the Court’s 
reasoning.  
Similarly, in Gourmet there is little discussion of discrimination: it might be 
recalled that the rules at issue prohibited the advertising of alcoholic products.
59
 In 
particular, the Swedish Government had submitted evidence to the effect that the sale 
of whisky and wine, mainly imported, had grown in comparison with the sale of 
vodka, mainly home-produced. The Court dismissed the evidence by holding that it 
could not be precluded that in the absence of the legislation at issue the switch in 
consumers’ preferences would have been greater60 (a probatio diabolica if ever there 
was one).
61
 While, again, it could be argued that a prohibition on advertising affects 
intra-Community trade regardless of discrimination (but then Keck should not apply 
to such rules), the reasoning of the Court, or part thereof, seems more driven by the 
desire that the rules at issue would be subject to justification, than by a grounded 
assessment of discrimination. 
                                                 
59
 Konsumentombudsmannen (KO) v Gourmet International Products AB (GIP)(n 9). 
60
 Para 22.  
61
 Cf AG Tesauro’s Opinion in Case C-292/92 Hünermund and Others v Landesapothekerkammer 
Baden-Württemberg [1993] ECR I-6787 where he talks about ‘probatio diabolica’ in relation to a de 
minimis test (para 21). In Gourmet the Court also referred to the fact that the evidence did not relate to 
beer.  
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Even leaving aside the above considerations, the Court’s approach to 
discrimination is not always consistent. Contrast, for instance, TK-Heimdienst and 
DocMorris, on the one hand, with Burmanjer and A-Punkt, on the other. As said 
above, TK-Heimdienst related to rules restricting door-to-door and sales on rounds of 
groceries to traders having an establishment within the district or a bordering district 
from where the sale on rounds was to take place;
62
 and DocMorris concerned rules 
that prohibited the internet sale of medicinal products.
63
 In both cases the Court found 
the rules to be indirectly discriminatory: in TK-Heimdienst, because of the fact that an 
establishment requirement is always discriminatory, regardless of the fact that it was 
very unlikely that out-of-State traders established in places not bordering with Austria 
would have any interest in travelling hundred of miles to sell their groceries door-to-
door. And in DocMorris, the rules were found to be discriminatory since: 
 
for pharmacies not established in Germany, the internet provides a more significant 
way to gain direct access to the German market. A prohibition which has a greater 
impact on pharmacies established outside German territory could impede access to the 
market for products from other Member States more than it impedes access for 
domestic products (para 74). 
 
On the other hand, in Burmanjer a prior authorisation requirement for the itinerant 
sale of periodicals was found not to be indirectly discriminatory;
64
 and in A-Punkt the 
same conclusion was reached in relation to rules prohibiting door-to-door sales of 
                                                 
62
 Schutzverband gegen unlauteren Wettbewerb v TK-Heimdiest Sass GmbH (n 49). 
63
 Deutscher Apothekerverband eV, 0800 DocMorris NV, Jacque Waterval (n 52).  
64
 Burmanjer (n 35). 
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jewellery.
65
 If the rationale in TK-Heimdienst and DocMorris was that the rules were 
indirectly discriminatory because they placed traders having an establishment in the 
national territory at an advantage compared to out-of-State traders who are less likely 
to have already established a presence in the host-State, then such a rationale should 
have applied a fortiori in the case of Burmanjer and A-Punkt. In the latter, small 
economic operators were prevented from effectively broadening their market without 
incurring significant costs;
66
 even though the Court left the assessment as to the 
existence of discrimination to the national court, it seemed doubtful as to its existence. 
In Burmanjer, the Court dismissed as ‘unproven’ the submission that rules on 
itinerant sales of periodicals might affect foreign periodicals more than domestic ones, 
to then add that even if there were such an effect, it would be ‘too insignificant and 
uncertain’ to hinder trade between Member States.67 It therefore seemed to espouse a 
de minimis approach which fits uncomfortably with its own case law.
68
    
Overall, those cases point at a flexible use of factual discrimination, so that 
certain rules are declared to be indirectly discriminatory regardless of any concrete 
evidence as to their disparate effect on imported goods. Furthermore, a rigorous 
approach to discrimination should entail a discussion of the appropriate comparator 
(existing trader or new market entrant?), which is generally lacking in the Court’s 
jurisprudence on selling arrangements. Finally, and as pointed out above, it is unclear 
                                                 
65
 Case C-441/04 A-Punkt Schmuckhandel [2006] ECR I-2093. 
66
 See also Commission’s submissions as reported in para 22 of the ruling.  
67
 Burmanjer(n 35) para 31. 
68
 For example recently Case C-212/06 Government of the French Community and Walloon 
Community v Government of the Flemish Community, judgment of 1 April 2008, not yet reported, para 
52. 
 
23 
why the effect of rules which are similar in kind is judged differently according to the 
case under consideration. This more flexible approach to discrimination might 
therefore suggest a considerable relaxation of the ‘selling arrangement’ exception, so 
that an increasing number of rules can be brought back within the scope of Article 28 
EC and undergo the proportionality scrutiny demanded by the mandatory 
requirements doctrine.   
 
C  The Boundary Between Selling Arrangements and Other Rules 
 
The third strand of case law that deserves attention is that in which the Court is called 
upon to assess the boundary between rules that fall within the scope of the Keck 
exception, and those which fall outside the ‘certain’ selling arrangements that benefit 
from a narrower application of Article 28 EC. In this respect, whilst rules which 
require the modification of the imported product can never be qualified as a selling 
arrangement,
69
 in certain cases rules which concern the modalities of sale might be 
excluded from the Keck exception;
70
 and in other cases it is more difficult to decide 
whether the rule does fall within the ‘selling arrangement’ category.  
                                                 
69
 For example Case C-368/95 Vereinigte Familiapress Zeitungsverlags- und vertriebs GmbH v 
Heinrich Bauer Verlag [1997] ECR I-3689; Case C-390/99 Canal Satélite Digital SL v Administracíon 
General del Estado [2002] ECR I-607; Case C-12/00 Commission v Spain (chocolate) [2003] ECR I-
459. 
70
 Other rules by nature do not fall within the product requirements/selling arrangements dichotomy 
since they do not relate either to the modalities of sale or to the physical characteristics of the products; 
see above, Section II.  
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For instance, juxtapose the case of Banchero, on rules which limited the sale 
of tobacco to authorised licensed retailers,
71
 to the case of Franzén, on a licensing 
requirement for the sale of alcoholic products.
72
 In the former case the rules were 
found to be non-discriminatory selling arrangements, whilst in the latter case the rules 
were found to fall outside the Keck exception and were therefore subject to the full 
force of the Dassonville formula. And yet, the rules at issue in the two cases both 
concerned a licensing requirement whereby the sale of given products was reserved to 
authorised retailers. 
Or compare the rules at issue in the case of Morellato with the rules at issue in 
Alfa Vita. As we have seen, in Morellato, rules concerning the packaging of bake-off 
products were found to be selling arrangements; as a result, the Court had to rely on a 
broad (and not entirely consistent) finding of discrimination in order to subject the 
rules to the proportionality assessment.
73
 On the other hand, in Alfa Vita rules 
restricting the sale of bread baked on the premises to stores which complied with all 
the requirements prescribed for bread-making establishments were found not to be 
selling arrangements since they did not take into consideration the specific nature of 
bake-off products; they entailed additional costs; and they made the marketing of 
bake-off products more difficult.
74
 In this respect, there seems to be some confusion 
so that the assessment of the effect of the rule is relevant in determining whether the 
                                                 
71
 Case C-387/93 Banchero [1995] ECR I-4663; see also (pre-Keck) C-23/89 Quietlynn Ltd and BJ 
Richards v Southend Borough Council [1990] ECR I-3059. 
72
 C-189/95 Criminal proceedings against H Franzén [1997] ECR I-5909. 
73
 T Morellato v Comune di Padova (No 2)(n 51). 
74
 Alfa Vita Vassilopoulos (n 26). 
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rule is a certain selling arrangement. In this way, the focus shifts back from assessing 
the ‘type’ of rule, to assessing its ‘effect’.  
It therefore seems that far from having introduced a rigid distinction, the 
application of the Keck ruling will very much depend on the specifics of the case at 
issue. And yet, in order to understand why certain selling arrangements are excluded 
from the scope of Article 28 EC, it is important to identify the rationale behind the 
Court’s decisions.   
 
V  Possible Explanations for the Exclusion of Certain Selling 
Arrangements from the Scope of Article 28 EC 
  
The most obvious explanation for the exclusion of certain selling arrangements from 
the scope of Article 28 EC is that suggested by the Court in Keck itself. Certain rules 
are excluded from the scope of the Treaty because, provided they are not 
discriminatory, they neither prevent market access nor impede it more than they 
impede it for domestic goods. However, and as this might be certainly true for some 
cases,
75
 such an explanation does not help in understanding the different approaches 
to discrimination, or the reason why some rules which seem similar, and which relate 
to the way a product can be sold, are classified sometimes as a certain selling 
arrangement, and sometimes not. For instance, a prohibition on door-to-door sales 
                                                 
75
 See especially those analysed in Section IVA above on the mechanical application of the Keck 
ruling.  
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such as the one at issue in A-Punkt, might affect the ability to access the market of 
out-of-State traders, who do not have an establishment in the territory, more than it 
affects access of domestic traders. And yet, the rules at issue were found, in principle, 
not to be discriminatory. On the other hand, a licensing requirement for the sale of 
alcoholic beverages, such as the one at issue in Franzén, does not have a 
discriminatory effect on market access (as the Court itself held in both Franzén and 
Banchero). And yet, the rules at issue in Franzén did not benefit from the Keck 
exemption. If the explanation contained in para 17 of Keck, according to which non-
discriminatory selling arrangements fall outside the scope of Article 28 EC because 
they do not prevent market access or impede it more than they impede it for domestic 
products, were always true, then these discrepancies in the case law are difficult to 
justify.  
For this reason, one needs to look at alternative possible explanations: the 
obvious one is to read Keck as a refinement of the Dassonville formula, in that it 
clarifies that a mere reduction in the volume of sales is not, in itself, enough to trigger 
Article 28 EC; and it introduces a presumption to the effect that certain rules are 
normally not liable to affect directly or indirectly, actually or potentially intra-
Community trade. Thus, some selling arrangements do not affect intra-Community 
trade in that any effect they have is an effect on trade as a whole and not specifically 
on trade in goods that have crossed a border. However, some rules concerning selling 
arrangements might have a specific effect on intra-Community trade, in which case 
they will be subject to scrutiny by either a broad interpretation of discrimination or by 
the exclusion of the applicability of the Keck presumption. Thus, for instance, the 
ruling in TK-Heimdienst seems consistent with the fact that Community law ill-
tolerates any establishment/residence requirement, even though the willingness of out-
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of-State traders to engage in the commercial practice at issue might be extremely 
unlikely (if not altogether remote). The ruling in DocMorris is fully justified should 
one consider the effectiveness of internet sales as a means to penetrate foreign 
markets. The licensing requirement in Franzén had an effect on intra-Community 
trade which the rules in Banchero lacked because of the extremely restrictive nature 
of the rules on the sales of alcoholic beverages in Sweden (as was also the case in 
Gourmet) compared to the non-restrictive effect of the Italian licensing rules on 
tobacco.
76
 The Swedish rules were aimed at discouraging consumption of alcohol; the 
Italian rules, on the other hand, were aimed at guaranteeing access to tobacco 
products throughout the national territory, including remote rural communities. 
Similarly, the rules in Morellato and Alfa Vita had the effect of making it excessively 
(and unnecessarily) difficult for a product, bake-off bread, which had traditionally not 
been sold in Italy and Spain, to be sold in those countries.
77
  
The focus on the effect on intra-Community trade rather than on the nature of 
the measure would also explain why rules that might be considered similar from an 
ontological viewpoint, such as licensing, authorisation or equipment requirements, are 
de facto treated in a different way depending on the circumstances. And again it 
would explain the ruling in Dynamic Medien.
78
 There, the rules at issue prohibited the 
sale by post of videos, movies and videogames which did not bear an age-limit label 
                                                 
76
 See also Case C-438/02 Hanner [2005] ECR I-4551, paras 32 and ff, on the distinction between 
Franzén and Banchero.  
77
 In this respect consider Gormley’s argument that the Sunday trading cases were simply a 
misapplication of the Dassonville formula, in that Sunday trading rules simply did not affect intra-
Community trade; see ‘Recent case law on the free movement of goods: some hot potatoes’ (1990) 27 
CML Rev 825.  
78
 Case C-244/06 Dynamic Medien, judgment of 14 February 2008, not yet reported.  
 
28 
corresponding to a classification decision of one of the competent bodies. Advocate 
General Mengozzi considered the rules to be certain selling arrangements because 
they concerned modalities of sale; the Court, on the other hand, in order to justify the 
exclusion of the Keck exception, focused also on the double burden that such rules 
would introduce in relation to those movies which had already undergone a similar 
scrutiny in the country of origin. However, regardless of the rules of the country of 
origin, it is clear that such rules affected the possibility of importing movies into 
Germany in that they required the goods to be subjected to the competent board to 
assess suitability for given age groups.  
This said, the exclusion of the application of Article 28 EC in Burmanjer and 
A-Punkt is still puzzling and might lead to the finding that the disparate application of 
the Keck formula indicates that certain rules are to be considered as barriers to intra-
Community trade only when their effect is more than minimal. And yet, the Court has 
so far refused to adopt a de minimis approach in relation to the free movement 
provisions.
79
 Furthermore, a de minimis approach would fail to explain why some 
licensing rules have an ‘appreciable’ effect on trade, whilst rules that restrict 
consumption of a product to a certain age group would (almost certainly) not.  
 
VI  Peralta and Keck v Peralta or Keck? 
 
                                                 
79
 For example recently Case C-212/06 Government of the French Community and Walloon 
Community v Government of the Flemish Community, judgment of 1 April 2008, not yet reported, para 
52.     
 
29 
At the beginning of this analysis we pointed out how the Keck ruling could be 
interpreted in two different ways, either as a decision aimed at excluding some rules 
from the scope of the Treaty for policy reasons; or, as a decision which merely 
rectified the mistaken interpretation given to Article 28 EC during the Sunday trading 
saga according to which a mere reduction in the volume of sales was enough to attract 
the rules within the ambit of the ‘potential’ restriction of intra-Community trade 
pursuant to the Dassonville ruling. The choice between the two alternative 
explanations is important to understand the scope of the Treaty both in order to 
determine the extent to which the Keck presumption is open to rebuttal and to assess 
the relationship between the remoteness doctrine and the Keck ruling. 
In this respect, it has been argued that while at the beginning the almost 
mechanical application of the Keck ruling suggested that it was a policy decision, the 
fine-tuning of its application in more recent years suggests that it is simply a tool to 
tame the excesses inherent in the broad Dassonville formula. Thus, the flexible ad hoc 
approach to discrimination, together with the ease with which the Court excludes 
certain rules from the ‘certain selling arrangements’ category, suggests that Keck 
simply introduces a useful system of presumptions as to which rules are more likely to 
affect intra-Community trade. In this respect, the only certainty after Keck seems to be 
that Sunday trading rules fall outside the scope of Article 28 EC (much as they fall 
outside the scope of the other free movement provisions).        
Thus Keck, far from introducing a rigid dichotomy where the test applied to 
assess the existence of a barrier to intra-Community trade depends on the type of rules 
at issue, simply introduces a useful and flexible system of presumptions. In this 
respect, if the crucial factor in the application of Article 28 EC is still the ‘effect’ on 
intra-Community trade, then there is a common rationale underlying the case law on 
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remoteness and the Keck doctrine. However, the two still differ for two reasons. First 
of all, the remoteness doctrine applies only to non-trading rules; secondly, it is only in 
the case of these rules that the claimant has to establish causation. Only if such 
causation exists will there be a second stage in the investigation to ascertain whether 
the alleged barrier is a barrier falling within the scope of Article 28 EC. On the other 
hand, in relation to trading rules causation is presumed exactly because they regulate 
trade and therefore the focus is exclusively on the existence of a barrier. This rather 
theoretical difference reflects then another presumption, this time in relation to non-
trading rules. Those rules, provided they are not discriminatory, do not affect intra-
Community trade unless a precise link of causation can be established.
80
 An example 
might be of use to illustrate this point. Take for instance rules on recovery of tax debt 
at issue in Krantz: those rules did not intend to regulate trade; while they might have 
had a spill-over effect on the ease with which commercial debt could be recovered, in 
themselves they did not affect trade. For this reason, it would fall upon the claimant to 
prove that there is a direct link of causation between the rule at issue, and their ability 
to enjoy the freedom granted by the Treaty. On the other hand, in relation to trading 
rules the causal effect is taken for granted and therefore even a purely potential effect 
on intra-Community trade is sufficient to trigger Article 28 EC. As a result, the trader 
does not need to prove a specific effect on her situation of the rules at issue. Consider 
for instance those cases in which the Member State unsuccessfully argued that rules 
of labelling might in certain instances not have a restrictive effect because of the need 
                                                 
80
 In this respect see also the ruling in V Graf v Filzmoser Maschinenbau GmbH (n 23), and below 
Section VII. 
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for the trader to modify the label to satisfy language requirements.
81
 These rules are 
defined as barriers because they potentially affect intra-Community trade and there is 
no need for the claimant to demonstrate a specific effect on her situation. In relation to 
trading rules causation is presumed and does not need to be proven. On the other 
hand, in relation to non-trading rules a potential and undemonstrated effect is not 
enough: the trader must establish causation to bring her situation within the scope of 
the Treaty.
82
  
This said, the rationale behind rules excluded pursuant to the application of the 
Keck presumptions and rules excluded because of the remoteness doctrine is the same: 
both rules do not have an effect on intra-Community trade relevant for the application 
of the Treaty. It seems therefore that Keck is less revolutionary than it might have 
appeared at first sight and the rigidity of the Keck formula is only apparent: what 
matters at the end is still whether the rules under scrutiny create a barrier to intra-
Community trade. If they do not, they will benefit from the Keck exception; but if 
they do they will be scrutinised either through a broad interpretation of 
discrimination; or by a limitation of the scope of Keck itself. 
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 Case C-317/92 Commission v Germany (expiry dates) [1994] ECR I-2039; and to a certain extent 
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VII  The Outer Limits of the Free Movement of Persons
83
 
 
The free movement of persons provisions catch, as well as directly and indirectly 
discriminatory rules, rules which hinder or discourage movement.
84
 The notion of 
hindrance/discouragement is interpreted in a generous way;
85
 and, the intra-
Community element necessary to trigger the Treaty has been considerably relaxed.
86
 
However, notwithstanding this broad interpretation there appear to be some limit to 
the scope of the free movement of persons provisions. The doctrine of ‘effect too 
uncertain and indirect’ applies also to the free movement of persons; and in some 
other cases (notably tax cases, but also social security cases) the interpretation of the 
free movement provisions seems narrower and limited to an assessment of 
discrimination. We shall consider these situations in turn.       
 
A  The Doctrine of Effect too Uncertain and Indirect and the Ruling in 
Deliège 
 
The rationale underpinning the doctrine of ‘effect too uncertain and indirect’ is the 
same regardless of the Treaty freedom invoked. As we have seen above, in order for 
                                                 
83
 The doctrine of effect too uncertain and indirect applies also to the free movement of capital; see 
Case C-282/04 Commission v Netherlands (Golden Shares) [2006] ECR I-9141, para 29.  
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the doctrine to apply the rules must be non-discriminatory; must not be intended to 
regulate intra-Community movement or the conditions for the exercise of the relevant 
Treaty freedom; and there must be no causal connection between the rule and the 
alleged barrier. Thus, for instance, in the above mentioned ruling of Semeraro Casa 
Uno,
87
 the Court found that Sunday trading rules fell outside the scope of Article 43 
EC since they applied in the same manner to all relevant traders; their purpose was 
not to regulate conditions concerning establishment; and their effect on freedom of 
establishment was too uncertain and indirect to be capable of hindering the Treaty 
freedom. Similarly, in Graf the Court found that in order for non-discriminatory rules 
to fall within the scope of Article 39 EC, an effect on access to the labour market was 
necessary.
88
 On the facts, that was not the case since the effect of the rules under 
consideration on free movement depended on a ‘future and hypothetical event’ and 
was therefore too uncertain and indirect to fall within the scope of the Treaty. And, in 
Coname,
89
 the Court indicated that a very modest economic interest in relation to a 
public contract might render Articles 49 and 43 EC inapplicable because undertakings 
located in other municipalities would have no interest in the contract at issue and 
therefore the effect of the situation on the Treaty freedoms would be too uncertain and 
indirect. The ruling in Coname is not as straightforward as it might appear since lack 
of transparency in the award of public contracts is considered to be indirectly 
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discriminatory;
90
 however, in theory indirectly discriminatory rules should not benefit 
form the ‘effect to uncertain and indirect’ doctrine. Should one not want to dismiss 
the reference to the remoteness doctrine as a non-conclusive obiter (in the case at 
issue the economic value of the contract was sufficiently high to trigger the Treaty), 
then the ruling might indicate the convergence of the ‘effect too uncertain and 
indirect’ doctrine into a de minimis assessment which however would sit at odds with 
the ruling in TK-Heimdienst, where out-of-state traders would also have had little if 
any interest in selling groceries door-to-door.  
In any event, it should be noted that the doctrine of effect ‘too uncertain and 
indirect’ has been applied more seldom in the field of persons, and indeed it is open to 
debate as to whether it is of any real significance. In particular, it could be queried 
whether the standard of proof required in order to be able to challenge rules that do 
not regulate intra-Community movement or the conditions for the exercise of the 
relevant freedom is any higher than that required to challenge rules regulating 
movement. Here, consider that in the case of natural persons the factors that might 
deter movement might not necessarily be linked to the conditions on the exercise of 
an economic activity. Thus, for instance, the rights of family members might be much 
more important to the migrant citizen than the need to fulfil an administrative 
requirement in order to pursue an economic activity. It is not surprising therefore that 
in these cases there seems no need to prove causation, either because it is given for 
granted; or simply because the scope of the Treaty free movement of persons 
provisions is broader.  
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The other proviso that might exclude the application of the free movement of 
persons provisions is the ‘Deliège exception’;91 in that case the Court excluded the 
applicability of Article 49 EC to rules governing the selection of athletes for 
international tournaments on the grounds that, even though those rules naturally 
determined a limitation in the number of participants, such a limitation was inherent 
in the conduct of international high-level sporting events. It is unclear whether the 
ruling is of relevance beyond the realm of sporting activities and to the author’s 
knowledge it has not been applied again.
92
 One could imagine however that a similar 
reasoning could be used to exclude the application of the free movement of persons 
provisions in relation to non-discriminatory taxation, to which we shall now turn. 
 
B  Non-discriminatory Taxation: A Keck-style or a Deliège-style 
Exception? 
 
Article 90 EC prohibits discriminatory and protectionist taxation of foreign goods; 
otherwise it is for the Member States to decide on the level of taxation of goods 
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within their territory with the possible (and so far theoretical) exception of taxation 
which is so high as to impede the free movement of goods.
93
  
In relation to the free movement of persons there is no provision equivalent to 
Article 90 EC; for this reason, discriminatory/protectionist taxation falls squarely 
within the scope of the Treaty free movement provisions. While this fact did not give 
rise to any problem when the scope of those provisions was limited to a prohibition on 
discrimination, the matter changed slightly once the Court decided to broaden the 
scope of the Treaty so as to include all rules which hindered or discouraged 
movement. It is obvious that high taxation might create a deterrent to movement; and 
yet, it is also obvious that the decision as to the level of taxation is, by its very nature, 
a political choice (possibly the ‘most’ political choice) and that therefore it should not 
be subject to the proportionality assessment by the Court of Justice.
94
 It is therefore 
not surprising that overall the Court has not engaged in the review of the level of 
taxation and, indeed, it has made clear that the rights granted by the Treaty do not 
entail the guarantee that movement will be neutral from a fiscal viewpoint.95 Rather, 
the bulk of the case law relating to taxation has focused on the discriminatory effect 
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of the rules governing the way taxation is levied, especially in relation to corporate 
entities.
96
 However, in relation to Article 49 EC, the Court maintains a more 
ambiguous position which is slightly at odds with what said above. In De Coster,
97
 the 
Court qualified a heavy tax on TV satellite dishes as a non-discriminatory obstacle to 
the free movement of services, thus suggesting that tax rules might be caught by the 
Treaty regardless of discrimination, and similar dicta can be found in the later cases of 
Viacom Outdoor II and Mobistar.
98
  
This said, it is open to debate as to whether this case law is indicative of a 
change of approach: in De Coster the Court did in any event assess the discriminatory 
effects of the tax in question by pointing out that the tax affected non-domestic 
broadcasters more than domestic ones, since the latter had unlimited access to the 
cable network, while the former necessarily had to rely on satellite transmission. In 
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Viacom Outdoor II the Court held that a tax on billboard advertising was not caught 
by Article 49 EC since it was non-discriminatory and its amount was fixed at a level 
to be considered modest in relation to the value of the services provided. In Mobistar, 
the Court excluded that a non-discriminatory tax on masts and pylon could fall within 
the scope of the Treaty free movement of services provisions if its only effect was to 
increase the cost of the service in question.
99
 Indeed, some authors have argued that 
Viacom Outdoor II and Mobistar, far from supporting the view of an expansion of the 
scope of Article 49 EC in the field of non-discriminatory taxation, might signal a 
retreat so that a more general Keck-style exception is being introduced in relation to 
the free movement of persons.
100
 While the present author is not so optimistic about 
the effect of this case law, it is argued that, despite the general dicta of the Court as to 
the fact that non-discriminatory taxation might be caught by the Treaty provisions on 
the free movement of services,
101
 taxation de facto if not de jure falls within the scope 
of the Treaty only in so far as it is directly or indirectly discriminatory. Furthermore, 
the same can be said in relation to social security rules where, with a few exceptions, 
the level of social security contribution will not be scrutinised unless there is evidence 
of discrimination on grounds of nationality or movement.
102
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If that is the case, there are two possible explanations which could provide a 
justification for the exclusion of certain rules from the scope of the free movement of 
persons provisions.
103
 First, it could be argued that this case law introduces a Keck-
style exception.
104
 Thus if, in the traditional reading of Keck, the latter excludes a 
certain type of rules (selling arrangements) from the scope of Article 28 EC unless 
discrimination can be proven or inferred from the rules under scrutiny, a similar 
rationale might apply to tax rules in the context of the free movement of persons. A 
policy decision has been made so as to disregard the possible effect on intra-
Community movement of tax rules in so far as they determine, in a non-
discriminatory way, the level of taxation. Since it is for the Member State to decide 
upon the level of taxation, the Court is not willing to syndicate that choice and 
therefore excludes such rules from the scope of the Treaty unless discrimination can 
be proven.  
Secondly, it could be argued that the more confined application of the Treaty 
free movement provisions is justified by a Deliège line of reasoning. In this respect, 
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tax rules, by definition, have an impact on the profitability of business; and such an 
impact is inherent in the very nature of tax rules which are aimed at imposing charges 
on economic operators to finance public expenditure. In the same way as it is 
unconceivable to have international tournaments without having rules governing the 
selection of participants to such competitions, it is unconceivable to have taxation 
which would not determine expenditure on those who are subject to it. Thus, those 
rules cannot be considered as a barrier because their effect on intra-Community 
movement is inherent in their aim, an aim which is a priori compatible with 
Community law.   
The Déliège line of reasoning differs then from the Keck-style reasoning. The 
latter is a policy decision: tax rules are barriers to intra-Community movement but 
they are best left to the Member States. The Déliège line of reasoning, on the other 
hand, is conceptual: when the alleged barrier coincides with the very purpose of the 
rules—be it selecting athletes, or raising funds for the public purse—then, provided 
the aim in itself is legitimate, any effect that the rule might have on movement is 
inherent in the rules at issue and therefore cannot be scrutinised. The Keck-style 
reasoning leaves it open for the Court to change its policy; the Déliège reasoning 
defines the boundaries of the free movement provisions and acknowledges that facing 
a disadvantage, a loss in profit, is not enough to claim that a barrier to intra-
Community movement was raised.  
 
VIII  Conclusions 
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The co-existence of different strands of case law, together with the use of different 
hermeneutic tools in relation to the same provisions, makes it extremely difficult to 
identify clear boundaries for the Treaty free movement provisions. Indeed, when the 
cases are closely scrutinised one might be excused for feeling a slight sense of 
desperation as to the chaotic picture arising from the Court’s jurisprudence. The 
number of variables influencing the outcome of a case, as well as reasoning which is 
at times erratic, makes the scholar’s job all the more difficult. In this respect, one 
should accept that it will never be possible to provide an umbrella under which all 
cases can sit comfortably. Furthermore, one should always be aware that the rationale 
underpinning the interpretation of the free movement provisions is fluid: it evolves as 
our perception of the problems and aims of the internal market changes with time. 
This is particularly visible in relation to the free movement of goods. In this respect, it 
should never be forgotten that the Keck ruling was a reaction to a specific problem—
that of an excessively broad interpretation of Article 28 EC.  
It is, therefore, not surprising that in the aftermath of the Keck ruling the main 
hermeneutic effort was directed at providing a clearer demarcation of the Treaty, so as 
to relocate the balancing exercise inherent in the proportionality assessment 
demanded by the mandatory requirements doctrine in the hands of national regulators. 
The mechanical application of Keck can then be properly understood as a policy 
decision aimed at correcting the imbalances created by the Sunday trading 
interpretation. However, with time, the application of Keck becomes more nuanced 
and the focus seems to shift back to the assessment of the effect on intra-Community 
trade of the rules under scrutiny. In this way, the rigid system of presumptions which 
characterised the Keck ruling evolves into a flexible system of presumptions which is 
still useful but not conclusive. Indeed, it could be noted that should one leave aside 
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the Sunday trading incident, the pre-Keck case law and the post-Keck case law are 
strikingly similar.   
In relation to the free movement of persons, and contrary to expectations, it is 
easier to identify the outer boundaries. Thus, the broader interpretation given to those 
provisions, as controversial as this might be, gives rise to a jurisprudence which is 
more internally consistent. The applicability of the Treaty freedoms is excluded only 
in relation to a handful of situations where it is impossible to establish a causal effect 
between rule and alleged barrier. And, in cases where the effect of the rule 
complained about, an effect which is a priori deemed legitimate in the Community 
system, is inherent in the very aim that the rule seeks to pursue. Taxes inherently 
inconvenience tax payers: it would be foolhardy to interpret such an inconvenience as 
a barrier to movement.  
